


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9 February 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Your Meeting this Afternoon with Secretary Harter on Berlin

1. Jim Critchfield has informed me of your inquiry as to the latest community approved estimates regarding the Soviet attitude towards Berlin.

2. No NIE or SNIE devoted specifically to the Berlin problem has been completed subsequent to June 1959. However, Berlin does figure in the general Soviet paper NIE 11-4-59 in two paragraphs. These are fully agreed national intelligence.

3. NIE 11-4-59: Main Trends in Soviet Capabilities and Policies, 1959-1964

Section VI

"26. By initiating the Berlin crisis in November 1958, the Soviets undertook, in Communist terms, a probing of the 'relation of forces.' They probably believed there was some chance that the Western states, recognizing the recent increases in Soviet power, would withdraw from Berlin. At a minimum, the Soviets expected to set in motion developments which would enhance the stability and international status of the East German regime.

"27. As of the present, the Soviets have allowed the Berlin crisis to diminish in intensity, and have disavowed any intention of hastening events by undue pressures. Nevertheless, they have not given up their objectives, nor the threat of eventual unilateral action. They clearly seek at least a limited agreement on Berlin which would undercut the Western position in the city and provide a basis for eventually bringing about a Western withdrawal. The value of even a marginal victory on the Berlin issue would still be so great to the Soviets -- both in consolidating the Communist regime in East Germany and in discrediting the Western alliance, above all in West Germany -- that it seems likely they will renew their pressure on West Berlin at some moment they deem propitious. We believe that, as long as the Soviets are confident that they can make progress towards their aims in Germany by negotiation and propaganda, they will probably abstain from any major interference with Western access to Berlin and from making a separate peace treaty with East Germany. If they decide that further progress is impossible by comparatively mild methods, they will probably make the separate peace treaty, though they would not necessarily try at the same time to obstruct Western access to Berlin."

SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP					
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APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION	
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Remarks: <p style="text-align: center;"> This memo forwarded to the Director according to the wishes of Jim Critchfield. It should be clipped to material which Critchfield himself is preparing on Berlin. </p> <p style="text-align: right;">Sherman Kent</p>					
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